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REFERENCE PRICING: A SMALL AND MIGHTY SOLUTION  
TO BEND THE HEALTH CARE COST CURVE 
 
SRISHTI MIGLANI* 
 
“Healthcare [is] . . . undoubtedly the most complex of all social systems.  
Perturbations of complex systems always produce unintended and 
unexpected consequences, even when  
all we are doing is eliminating perversion”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
There is no single antidote to the problem of rising health care 
costs. These costs can be attributed to: the aging population; current 
payment and delivery structures; administrative burdens; demand for newer 
medical technology; lack of transparency in price and quality of care; 
increased health care utilization; insurance benefit design; market 
consolidation; high per-unit price of medical services; the legal, regulatory, 
and tax environment; the current structure of the health care workforce; and 
restrictions on the practice of medicine.2 With a multitude of cost drivers, it 
is naïve to expect a one-size-fits-all solution. Unrealistic expectations can 
create an unwelcoming atmosphere for strategies that only address one or 
may be two of the factors that continue to make health care expenditures a 
greater percentage of our gross domestic product (GDP). To reduce health 
care costs, we need multiple strategies that, when combined, will address 
the inefficiencies in health care and lessen the extensive control providers 
have over prices of medical procedures and services.3  
                                                                                                                                      
* Associate Counsel, Administrative and Civil Remedies Branch, Office of 
Counsel to the Inspector General (OCIG), Office of Inspector General (OIG), 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). This article was written 
during my studies at the Saint Louis University School of Law. I am presently 
working at the DHHS, OIG. The opinions presented herein are those of the 
author(s) and do not represent the views or policies of the DHHS OIG. 
1 JOHN GOODMAN, PRICELESS 309 (2012).  
2  What is Driving U.S. Health Care Spending: America’s Unsustainable 
Health Care Cost Growth, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. 1, 17 (Sept. 2012), available 
at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%20Health%20Care%20Cost%20Drivers%
20Brief%20Sept%202012.pdf. 
3 Trends in Health Care Cost Growth and the Role of the Affordable Care Act, 
The White House (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/healthcostreport_final_noembar
go_v2.pdf; Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Holmes & Jonathan Skinner, Is This Time 
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One strategy that has proven its effectiveness is reference pricing 
(RP). RP is an insurance benefit design mechanism in which a “reference” 
price is set for a specified service or procedure, which the health plan 
sponsor uses to cap its contribution. The beneficiary is responsible for any 
amount above the defined contribution.4 RP seeks to address the significant 
price variations that exist for medical procedures and services. 5  RP 
combines both consumer- and provider-targeted strategies to lower health 
care costs. On the consumer side, RP originates from the consumer-driven 
health care movement. It aims to put the consumer’s “skin in the game” to 
help steer the health care market in the right direction. By giving the 
insurers some clout, it aims to reduce providers’ market power and control 
over the prices of medical services. This paper will examine how and why 
RP shifts risks to consumers and why it is a more effective form of risk 
sharing than the ones currently being used. 
                                                                                                                                      
Different? The Slowdown in Healthcare Spending, THE NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH (2013). 
4  Francois de Brantes et al., Reference Pricing and Bundled Payments, 
CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, 1 (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.catalyzepaymentreform.org/images/documents/matchtochangemarkets.
pdf. 
5 For example, the price for a colonoscopy varies from $800 to $3,160 in the 
U.S., which is an approximately a 300 percent price variation. Colonoscopy, 
HEALTHCARE BLUE BOOK (2012), http://consumerhealthchoices.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Colonoscopy-HCBB.pdf; see also Elizabeth Rosenthal, 
The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill: Colonoscopies Explain Why U.S. Leads the World 
in Health Expenditures, N.Y. Times, A1 (June 1, 2013) (discussing the price 
variation of colonoscopies around the country); The Editorial Board, The Weird 
World of Colonoscopy Costs, N.Y. Times SR10 (June 9, 2013). Castlight Health’s 
price comparison tool for medical services across the nation shows that a lipid 
panel costs $26 in Los Angeles, $40 in Phoenix, Arizona, $34 in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, and $76 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Analysis Details Most and Least 
Expensive Cities for Common Medical Services: Pricing for the Same Medical 
Services is All Over the Map (Literally), Lipid Panel, CASTLIGHT HEALTH (Oct. 
23, 2014), http://www.castlighthealth.com/price-variation-map/. This shows a price 
variation of 192 percent between the price offered in Los Angeles and Salt Lake 
City. The average price for a head/brain CT scan in Norfolk, Virginia is $1,230 
with prices ranging from $218 to $1,703 and in Richmond, Virginia, the average 
price is 1,307 with prices ranging from $218 and $2,009 (This price variation could 
be the result of many factors which are not discussed here). Analysis Details Most 
and Least Expensive Cities for Common Medical Services: Pricing for the Same 
Medical Services is All Over the Map (Literally), Head/brain CT scan, CASTLIGHT 
HEALTH (Oct. 23, 2014),  http://www.castlighthealth.com/price-variation-map/.  
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Although RP’s application to procedures and services is a novel 
concept, RP has been used in the international pharmaceutical market for 
some time and has achieved success in lowering drug prices. RP’s success 
in reducing overall costs for large U.S. employers that have implemented it 
in their plan design has laid the groundwork for widespread adoption by 
other similarly-situated employers. A 2013 survey conducted by Aon 
Hewitt found that out of more than 1,230 employers surveyed, sixty-two 
percent planned to adopt RP in the next three to five years.6  RP is here to 
stay; however, its place and role in the current health care system has to be 
understood and its limitations need to be acknowledged and monitored to 
ensure it does not adversely impact the quality, access, and affordability of 
care.  
At this early stage, it is important to recognize that RP is not the 
solution to address rising health care costs, it is merely one solution. Its 
success and widespread adoption, however, should be accompanied by 
cautious optimism. This paper argues that RP can be structured to reap its 
price-saving potential, but it requires proper regulatory oversight to ensure 
it does not negatively impact quality, affordability, and access to care. If 
implemented in a systematic and cautious manner, it can become a useful 
tool for employers and health plans, especially when combined with 
bundled payments. Section II of this paper defines RP and explains its 
origins in the consumer-driven health care movement. Section III 
highlights RP’s application in the international market for pharmaceuticals 
and domestic market for medical services and procedures.  Sections IV 
explores the short-term and long-term considerations respectively that 
health plans need to examine and evaluate to implement RP appropriately 
while balancing the interests of the consumer and cost-saving effects of RP. 
Section V touches on the possibility of combining RP with bundled 
payments. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
6 Aon Hewitt 2013 Health Care Survey, AON HEWITT, 13 (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-
consulting/2013_Health_Care_Survey.pdf; Another survey conducted by Towers 
Watson and the National Business Group on Health also showed increased 
adoption of RP in the coming years. Reshaping Health Care: Best Performers 
Leading the Way, 18th Annual Towers Watson/National Business Group on Health 
Employer Survey on Purchasing Value in Health Care, TOWERS WATSON/NAT’L 
BUS. GRP. ON HEALTH, 20 (2013), http://www.towerswatson.com/en-
US/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/03/Towers-Watson-NBGH-
Employer-Survey-on-Value-in-Purchasing-Health-Care?page=3.  
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II. RP AND ITS ORIGINS 
 
A. DEFINITION 
 
RP is a type of defined contribution approach in which the plan 
sponsor either pays a fixed amount or sets a limit for how much it will pay 
towards the cost of a health care service.7 If a plan member chooses a 
health care provider or service that costs more than the limit set by the plan 
sponsor, then the plan member has to pay the difference, which I will refer 
to as the “gap price.”8 The price limit that is set by the plan sponsor is 
called the “reference price.”9 The insurer selects a service or procedure 
(“reference-priced service” or “reference-price procedure”) for which it 
wants to set a reference price. It negotiates the cost of a certain service or 
procedure with the health providers in a defined geographic area. After 
taking the average of the prices quoted by the providers, the plan sponsor 
evaluates the quality of services provided by the different providers and 
decides on a reference price.10  
RP functions like a “reverse-deductible”: the health plan or 
employer pays the initial part of the allowed cost and the consumer pays 
the remainder of the charge for the care.11 Once established, the reference 
                                                                                                                                      
7 Paul Fronstin, Reference Pricing for Health Care Services: A New Twist on 
the Defined Contribution Concept in Employment-Based Health Benefits, EMP’T 
BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., 4 (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_398_apr14.refprcng.pdf. Project 
Millennial refers to RP as “micro-voucherization’ of health care.” Mike Miesen, 
The “Micro-Voucherization” of Health Insurance: Can Reference Pricing Bend 
the Curve?, PROJECT MILLENNIAL (June 27, 2013), 
http://projectmillennial.org/2013/06/27/the-micro-voucherization-of-health-
insurance-can-reference-pricing-bend-the-curve/.  
8 Id.  
9 Amanda E. Lechner, Rebecca Gourevitch & Paul B. Ginsburg, The Potential 
of Reference Pricing to Generate Health Care Savings: Lessons from a California 
Pioneer, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, 1 (2013). 
10 Id. at 3. Although quality determinations are difficult to conduct, CalPERS’ 
experiment with RP provides a blueprint for other insurers looking to adopt RP to 
conduct their quality determinations. Also, it is important to acknowledge that 
insurers might have an incentive to sacrifice quality for price. But for an insurer 
looking to lower its costs for certain procedures by adopting RP, it is in the best 
interests of the insurer to balance quality with price to ensure that its clients do not 
have to go for repeat procedures or require more than usual follow-up care, which 
in turn might result in higher overall costs for the insurer.   
11 Fronstin, supra note 7, at 5. 
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price becomes the maximum amount the insurer will pay, whether a patient 
sees an in-network or out-of-network provider. “For out-of-network 
services, the reference price is identical to a [usual, customary, and 
reasonable (UCR)]-based ‘allowed amount.’”.” 12  But for in-network 
services subject to RP, the reference prices are different than, and 
essentially an override, of the previously negotiated prices for those 
services.13 
RP’s goals are three-fold: (1) to make the consumer an active 
participant in choosing where to receive the health care services, while 
being cognizant of the price; (2) to direct the plan members towards low-
price providers; and (3) to motivate high-price providers to lower their 
prices to retain market share.14 An RP program can achieve its goals with 
participation from insurers, providers, and consumers and the development 
of processes that create a transparent and informed atmosphere. First, the 
plan sponsor has to obtain pricing information from the providers for the 
negotiated services. 15  Then the health plan sponsor has to inform 
consumers about the reference prices and quality of care information for 
the providers. Lastly, the plan sponsor must continuously monitor the 
reference prices and quality of care to determine which providers to include 
in its reference-priced network. Although the development of an RP 
program might appear simple, it comes with several caveats and 
preconditions for success, all of which will be discussed in Section V. 
 
B. ORIGINS 
 
Catalyst for Payment Reform—an independent, national nonprofit 
organization that aims to effect change in the health care system—defined 
reference pricing as a market-based approach that works at the 
                                                                                                                                      
12  Jon Glaudemans et al., Reference Pricing and Network Adequacy 
Standards: Conflict or Concord? HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/09/18/reference-pricing-and-network-adequacy-
standards-conflict-or-concord/.  
13 Id. 
14 Fronstin, supra note 7, at 5. As I discuss in Section V, putting the onus on 
consumers has its disadvantages and those have to be recognized and 
acknowledged in order for RP to become an acceptable and cost-saving tool for the 
insurance industry. 
15 How to Make Reference Pricing Work for Consumers, FAMILIES USA, 5 
(June 2014), http://familiesusa.org/product/how-make-reference-pricing-work-
consumers. 
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“intersection of consumer engagement and provider contracting.” 16  RP 
nudges consumers to take an active role in the purchase of health care 
services, while forcing providers to provide the reference-priced procedure 
or service at or below the reference price. By “restoring some control to the 
health care purchasers and prompting providers of health care services to 
innovate and compete on both price and quality,” RP addresses both the 
demand and supply side of the health care system.  
The health care system has actively reduced the amount of control 
consumers have over prices, and has made the purchasing process a 
passive, mindless experience. The consumer-driven health care (CDHC) 
movement began to put consumers in the driver seat and help regain some 
of the lost control. CDHC is based on the idea that patients can be better 
economically-responsible consumers of health care if they are forced to pay 
a larger share of the health care they consume.17  
Additionally, CDHC is rooted in the belief that moral hazard is one 
reason for rising health care costs.18 Moral hazard is “the intangible loss-
producing propensities of the individual assured.”19 In other words, it is the 
idea that an individual who possesses health insurance tends to consume 
more medical care than an uninsured individual. 
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RAND HIE) confirmed 
the existence of moral hazard. The RAND HIE was a randomized-
controlled study designed to answer whether free medical care, when 
compared to insurance plans with cost-sharing requirements, leads to better 
health.20 Three thousand five-hundred fifty-eight non-disabled individuals 
between the ages of fourteen and sixty-one were assigned to a set of 
insurance plans containing varying levels of cost-sharing for either three or 
five years. The health effects of these groups were measured and 
compared.21 The study found that “the more people had to pay for medical 
                                                                                                                                      
16 Provider Market Power in the U.S. Health Care Industry: Assessing its 
Impact and Looking Ahead, CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, 4 (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.catalyzepaymentreform.org/images/documents/Market_Power.pdf. 
17 James C. Robinson & Paul B. Ginsburg, Consumer-Driven Health Care: 
Promise And Performance, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS, w272, w278 (2009).  
18 Id. at 18. 
19 Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard; Comment, 58 THE AMER. 
ECON. REVIEW 531, 535 (1968). 
20 Robert H. Brook et al., The Effect of Coinsurance on the Health of Adults: 
Results from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, RAND CORP. i., v (1984).  
21 Id. at 3. The people in the cost-sharing group were further divided further 
into three groups: (1) individual deductible plan: “the family paid 95 percent of the 
cost of all outpatient care for up to an annual out-of-pocket expenditure of $150 
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care, the less they used. Adults who had to share the cost of care made 
about a third fewer ambulatory visits and were hospitalized about a third 
less often.”22 While free health care “did not improve the health status 
across the range of measures or income groups examined, it did confer 
demonstrable benefits for patients with selected conditions that physicians 
are trained to manage.” 23  The RAND HIE concluded that there is an 
inverse relationship between cost sharing and consumption of health care. 
The increase in consumption of health care is attributable to many factors, 
including the effect of insurance on reducing the price from market price to 
zero at the time of service, and the knowledge that an individual’s excess 
usage is spread over all other purchasers.24  Therefore, the RAND HIE 
indicated that making the consumer more price-sensitive to the cost of 
medical services at the point of service can be a solution to the problem of 
moral hazard.25  
Restoring control to the consumer, by itself, is not sufficient to 
address the power imbalance in our health care system. The other problem 
that needs to be addressed is the great market power that providers have 
over the prices of health care services and procedures.26  With big hospital 
                                                                                                                                      
per person ($450 per family)”; (2) intermediate coinsurance plan: “the family paid 
25 or 50 percent of all health bills each year, inpatient and outpatient, until it had 
spent 5, 10, or 15 percent of its income or $1000 (whichever was less)”; or (3) 
income-related catastrophic plans: “the family paid 95 percent of its health bills up 
to the same ceiling as in the intermediate plans.” Id. The effect of cost-sharing on 
people’s health was evaluated by looking at the following eleven measures: 
physical health, role functioning, mental health, social contacts and general health 
ratings, smoking behavior, weight, cholesterol level, diastolic blood pressure level, 
visual acuity, and an index of risk of dying from certain risk factors, specifically 
systolic blood pressure, cholesterol, and smoking habits. Id. at vi.   
22 Id  at 25. 
23 Id. at 28.  
24 Pauly, supra note 19, at 532, 535.  
25 Brook et al., supra note 20, at 25–28. Other research shows that moral 
hazard does not explain why all kinds of health care expenditures. See John A. 
Nyman, Is 'Moral Hazard' Inefficient? The Policy Implications Of A New Theory, 
23 Health Affairs (2007). Nyman argues that moral hazard “makes sense for 
cosmetic surgery or drugs to improve sexual functioning or designer-style 
prescription sunglasses, but not for serious treatments such as coronary bypass 
operations or organ transplants.” Id. Therefore, cost sharing mechanisms might not 
be the solution to reduce health care consumption for those procedures which are 
not prone to moral hazard. Id.  
26 Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing and Healthcare 
Spending Growth, 25 THE J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 47, 53–54 (2011).   
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chains and provider groups dominating most local markets, providers are 
able to get extremely high rates from dominant insurers that feel compelled 
to pay those high rates to maintain the providers in their networks. 27 
Additionally, the consolidation of the health care market has increased the 
monopoly power of the large providers and given them bargaining power 
over insurers. 28  Insurers have little incentive to negotiate lower rates 
because they know they can pass on the additional costs to consumers and 
businesses.29 This market failure, resulting from insufficient competition, 
has nurtured providers’ expectations of higher prices, which has, in turn, 
not only adversely impacted the private insurance sector, but public 
programs, as well. Diane Archer, Special Counsel and Co-Director of the 
Health Care for All Project at the Institute for America’s Future, explains: 
 
[T]he private health care marketplace will continue to set 
excessive rates until they are stopped. These exorbitant 
rates are not only hurting working people, they are also 
driving up Medicare costs and imposing a massive burden 
on taxpayers and the federal government. Doctors and 
hospitals are conditioned to expect higher and higher rates 
and demand higher payments from public programs.30 
 
So in order to address the market failures that have not been corrected by 
the market, insurers need to have greater bargaining power to dictate 
prices. Even though the consolidation and merger wave cannot be stopped, 
a market in which the providers and insurers can negotiate with 
approximately the same amount of bargaining power can be created. As an 
economic matter, the increased competition will hopefully reduce health 
care prices for consumers and curb the growth of health care spending.31 
Use of RP in the pharmaceutical, medical procedures, and medical services 
markets has shown that (1) consumers can be empowered to have greater 
control over their health care expenditures and (2) insurers and providers 
                                                                                                                                      
27 Diane Archer, No Competition: The Price of a Highly Concentrated Health 
Care Market, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/03/06/no-competition-the-price-of-a-highly-
concentrated-health-care-market/.  
28 BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 2, at 17. 
29 Id. 
30 Diane Archer, No Competition: The Price Of A Highly Concentrated Health 
Care Market, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (March 6, 2013).  
31 See Lawrence C. Baker et al., Physician Practice Competition and Prices 
Paid by Private Insurers for Office Visits, 312 JAMA 1653 (2014).  
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can successfully use their respective market power to negotiate and bring 
health care expenditures down to reasonable levels. 
 
III. APPLICATION OF REFERENCE PRICING  
 
A. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
The history of RP in the pharmaceutical sector provides some 
important insights into its potentials and shortcomings. The use of RP in 
the pharmaceutical industry has been successful because of the lack of 
significant heterogeneity between different drugs, and as a result, RP’s 
implementation has been easier. The goal of using RP in the 
pharmaceutical industry is to “reduce the price of [reference-priced] 
products either through a relative decrease in the demand for high-priced 
products (a demand-side approach) or through cuts in drug prices by 
encouraging self-restraint (a supply-side approach).”32 The only difference 
in its application in the pharmaceutical industry, compared to the market 
for procedures and services, is the manner in which the reference price is 
set for classes of interchangeable drugs. 33  Drugs are grouped by either 
general referencing or therapeutic referencing. 34  Generic referencing 
applies to only generically equivalent products with the same active 
ingredient and formulation.35 On the other hand, therapeutic referencing 
only applies to drugs with different molecules for the same indication.36 A 
third party payer sets a maximum reimbursement price for a group of 
                                                                                                                                      
32  Jaume Puig-Junoy, What is Required to Evaluate the Impact of 
Pharmaceutical Reference Pricing, 4 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. AND HEALTH POL’Y 
87, 87 (2005). 
33 M.N.G. DUKES ET AL., DRUGS AND MONEY: PRICES, AFFORDABILITY, AND 
COST CONTAINMENT 85 (7th ed. 2002). “Several options exist [to determine classes 
of interchangeable drugs]: one can for example limit the system to certain drug 
categories, usually those representing a major share of a drug budget; one can 
apply different criteria to the various classes in order to decide on the degree of 
interchangeability of the drugs within each; and one can choose to introduce the 
method gradually, experimentally or incrementally, perhaps in order to arrive 
ultimately at a comprehensive reference system.” Id. at 86. 
34  Patricia M. Danzon & Jonathan D. Ketcham, Reference Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals for Medicare: Evidence from Germany, The Netherlands, and 
New Zealand, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., 2 (2003), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10007.pdf. 
35 Id. at 3. 
36 Id.  
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pharmaceutical products called “clusters.”37 If a patient chooses a drug 
within the cluster, then he does not have to incur any out-of-pocket costs.38 
Otherwise, the patient pays the difference between the reference price and 
the reimbursement level set for the cluster.39  
Before an RP system for drug pricing can be set up, the number 
and scope of interchangeable drugs have to be defined, the manner in 
which reimbursement levels for each individual class of drugs will be 
calculated has to be formulated, a procedure to define the classes of drugs 
and set reimbursement levels has to be determined, and methods to allow 
exceptions have to be established.40 
Some countries determine the reference price by comparing within 
the domestic or international markets and using the weighted average of the 
prices of drugs in the group as sold on the domestic market.41 In a market 
with substantial generic competition resulting in large price differences 
among products, the price of the cheapest generic product is used.42 Drug 
classification techniques vary from country to country, and some use a 
combination of these methods. 43  RP policies within a country can, 
however, vary greatly by insurer.44  The Netherlands, for example, uses 
price comparisons from other countries with similar purchasing power, 
such as France, Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.45 Setting 
reimbursement levels can be a highly politicized process because of its 
potential economic impact on the pharmaceutical industry. There is no easy 
                                                                                                                                      
37 Puig-Junoy, supra note 32, at 87. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 M.N.G. DUKES ET AL., supra note 33, at 86. 
41 Id. at 87. 
42 Id. at 85, 87. The ways in which countries set their reimbursement levels are 
not limited to these two methods. For example, British Columbia uses the 
reference drug that is “most cost-effective within its class,” based on scientific 
evidence accepted by the national regulatory agency, as the standard. Id. 
Netherlands, on the other hand, uses the defined daily dose to set the price for each 
drug group within the Netherland’s pharmaceutical reference pricing system. Id. 
43 Id. at 86–87.  
44  The RP policies vary according to: “equivalence level and criteria; 
determination of the reference price level; inclusion of patented drugs; therapeutic 
groups included; system of exemptions from the co-payment associated with RP; 
level and type of pre-existing co-payment; incentives for doctors and pharmacists; 
price regulation system; number of producers competing in the market; 
possibilities of parallel trade; relationship between domestic prices and price 
regulation in other countries.” 
45 DUKES ET AL., supra note 33, at 88. 
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solution to take politics out of pharmaceutical price-setting because of the 
size and power of the pharmaceutical industry. However, a market-based 
solution that is overseen by a consumer-friendly regulatory framework can 
work to counteract political forces.    
The mechanisms in place to determine exceptions to RP are 
fundamental to the pharmaceutical RP program. Due to the individualized 
nature of medicine and health, the drugs in a cluster might not be safe or 
effective for a certain patient’s diagnosis, or the patient’s condition might 
demand a drug that is not reference priced. For example, the RP program 
implemented by Pharmacare in British Columbia, Canada, allows 
physicians to apply for a “special authority” exemption from the program 
when switching drugs would be inadvisable. 46  So “the physicians can 
choose not to switch medications for particular patients if side effects or 
other adverse consequences are expected to result. A physician may present 
the case to the sick fund, arguing that the patient should be fully refunded, 
but the patient may ultimately have to pay the difference in order to receive 
a more expensive drug.”47 Certain new innovative drugs that do not fit into 
the existing clusters can be exempted in some cases.48 Exemptions work as 
a relief valve for patients who might have difficulties switching 
medications.49  
In countries such as Germany and the Netherlands where reference 
groups are defined broadly, the heterogeneity of the medications within 
each group increases.50 The effectiveness of the different drugs within a 
group, despite their interchangeability, varies. Exceptions are allowed to 
ensure that heterogeneity does not compromise quality. Exceptions have 
also been granted when there is a concern of patient frailty or if there is a 
record of previous failure with the treatment.51  
                                                                                                                                      
46 Paul v. Grootendorst et al., Impact of Reference-Base Pricing of Nitrates on 
the Use and Costs of Anti-Anginal Drugs, 165 CANADIAN MED. ASSOC. J. 1011, 
1012 (2001). 
47 DUKES ET AL., supra note 33, at 88. 
48 Lisa L. Ioannides-Demos et al., Reference Based Pricing Schemes: Effect on 
Pharmaceutical Expenditure, Resource Utilisation and Health Outcomes, 20 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 577, 589 (2002). 
49 Id.  at 583.  
50  Stevens Simoens & Sandra de Coster, Sustaining Generic Medicines 
Markets in Europe, RESEARCH CTR. FOR PHARMACEUTICAL CARE AND 
PHARMACO-ECONOMICS, 68 (2006), 
http://www.assogenerici.org/articolihome/simoens-report_2006-04.pdf. 
51  Sebastian Schneeweiss et al., Outcomes of Reference Pricing for 
Angiotensin-converting-Enzyme Inhibitors, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 822, 823 
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B. EFFECTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL RP 
 
In the pharmaceutical sector, RP has been instituted in Germany, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, British Columbia (Canada), New 
Zealand, and several other Central and Eastern European countries. Due to 
the different RP programs in place in each country and other cost-control 
measures instituted by some countries, it is difficult to compare and 
generalize the effects of one country’s RP program to others. However, 
data collected from different countries has allowed researchers to 
understand the short- and long-term effects of RP.  
RP has faced criticism and opposition from several groups. The 
pharmaceutical industry has opposed RP because it does not take into 
account the “unique advantages” of each new drug that demands a higher 
reimbursement rate.52 Physicians and patients have expressed their fears 
owing to the unknown health effects that switching a drug might have on 
the patient.53 Similarly, payers and health care organizations fear increased 
consumption of health care resources by patients who have been asked to 
switch to a reference priced drug and who have adverse effects as a result 
of the switch.54 Despite many criticisms,55 RP has the potential to become 
an effective price control tool. Pharmaceutical prices in the classes of drugs 
where RP is implemented have adjusted to the reference price levels.56 RP 
has motivated physicians to prescribe and patients to consume less 
expensive options, and the robust exceptions process has provided 
flexibility for clinical decisionmaking. Also, patient cost sharing has 
decreased.57 More research, however, is needed to better understand the 
impact of RP on patient outcomes.  
RP has emerged as a policy solution to control the costs of U.S. 
                                                                                                                                      
(2002). 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Some arguments against using RP in the pharmaceutical industry are that it: 
(1) has unfairly harsh effects on people with lower income who cannot afford a 
drugs outside the reference-priced clusters, (2) interferes with physician’s clinical 
judgment, (3) requires the physician to devote time to getting exceptions to 
prescribe non-reference-priced products, (4) can give rise to other health care costs 
for patients who might react adversely to switching the drug, (5) introduces a 
financial component to the physician-patient relationship, and (6) promotes 
inappropriate prescribing. Ioannides-Demos et al., supra note 48, at 587. 
56 DUKES ET AL., supra note 33, at 89.  
57 Id.  
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drug pricing. Its adoption in the domestic market, however, has been 
extremely limited. 58  Kroger Co. implemented RP for its prescription 
medication program in 2012 and, as a result, experienced $4.3 million in 
savings that year. The international experience with RP provides an 
evidence base to estimate its potential benefits for the U.S. pharmaceutical 
market.59 Some health care experts have recommended RP as “an attractive 
policy strategy” to control costs without negatively affecting medication 
use or resource consumption. 60  Economists Panos Kanavos and Uwe 
Reinhardt, however, have cautioned against overenthusiasm for replicating 
the RP system in the US: 
 
Given the importance of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry 
to the nation’s and, indeed, the world’s health care 
systems, the uncertainty still surrounding the impact of RP 
on health care, and the political capital that must be spent 
to implement such a system, U.S. public policymakers 
probably will want to venture cautiously into this terrain.61 
 
Factors including (1) centralization of the RP system, (2) breadth of 
therapeutic clusters of drugs, (3) administrative structures to support such a 
program, and (4) effect of RP on the quality, cost, and innovation in health 
care have to be carefully examined before the existing RP systems can be 
replicated and adopted by the U.S. pharmaceutical market. 
 
C. US HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PROCEDURES MARKET: 
CALPERS, KROGER, AND SAFEWAY 
 
 The experience with RP in the pharmaceutical industry prompted 
its adoption by a handful of US purchasers of prescription drugs as well as 
outpatient, elective procedures. This section will highlight the experience 
of a large health benefit provider, CalPERS, with RP as applied to hip and 
                                                                                                                                      
58  Joy Li-Yueh Lee et al., A Systematic Review of Reference Pricing: 
Implications for US Prescription Drug Spending, 18 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE 
e429, e429 (2012). 
59 Kate Sullivan, Reference Pricing Saves Insurance, Patients Money, FIERCE 
HEALTH  PAYER (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.fiercehealthpayer.com/story/reference-pricing-saves-insurers-patients-
money/2013-11-19.  
60 Li-Yueh et al., supra note 58, at e430, e436. 
61  Paul Kanavos & Uwe Reinhardt, Reference Pricing For Drugs: Is It 
Compatible With U.S. Health Care?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 16, 28 (2003).  
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knee replacement surgeries.  
 CalPERS is the third largest purchaser of employee health benefits 
in the nation offering health benefits to more than 1.3 million public 
employees, retirees, and their families.62 CalPERS members include current 
and retired employees of the state of California and some local 
governments.63 Employees can choose between three types of plans: (1) 
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), (2) health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs), and (3) exclusive provider organizations (EPOs) 
(limited to members in certain counties in California).64 More than two-
thirds of CalPERS members are enrolled in an HMO plan, and all plans 
offer separate Medicare supplemental plans for Medicare eligible 
members. 65  Seven different providers—Anthem, Kaiser Permanente, 
Health Net, Sharp Health Plan, United Healthcare, and CVS Caremark—
provide the health plans offered by CalPERS.66 
 Seven-and-a-half percent of CalPERS’ total insurance-related costs 
were related to joint and muscle conditions, and out of those, ten percent 
                                                                                                                                      
62  Health Benefits Overview, CalPERS (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/benefits-overview/health/benefits-
overview.xml (last visited Nov. 30, 2014); Health Benefits, CalPERS (May 20, 
2012), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/benefits-
overview/health/home.xml (last visited Nov. 30, 2014). CalPERS has a total of 
1,678,996 members with 1,104,237 active and inactive members and 574,759 
retirees, beneficiaries, and survivors receiving a monthly allowance. Facts at a 
Glance, CalPERS, 1 (Nov. 2014), (http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-
docs/about/facts/facts-at-a-glance.pdf. 
63  Facts at a Glance, CALPERS, 1 (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/facts-at-a-glance.pdf. 
64  Health Benefits Overview, CALPERS (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/benefits-overview/health/benefits-
overview.xml. 
65 Id. 
66  Currently, CalPERS offers HMO and PPO plans through Anthem. 
BlueShield of California offers HMO plans. Health Net offers two HMO plans and 
a Medicare Advantage plan for CalPERS retirees in the Southern California region. 
Kaiser offers plans for non-Medicare and Medicare enrollees. Sharp Health Plan 
offers plans for members in the San Diego County. United Healthcare of California 
offers and HMO plan to CalPERS members in some counties in Northern and 
Southern California. CVS serves as the pharmacy benefit provider for the PPO and 
newly contracted HMO plans. Presenting the CalPERS 2014 Health Plans 
Transcript, CALPERS (Sept. 2014), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-
docs/about/video-web-center/videos/health-benefits/transcript-all-videos.pdf. 
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were for routine knee and hip replacements.67 Noting major price variations 
within geographic regions, in 2011, CalPERS teamed up with Anthem to 
implement RP for its hip and knee replacement procedures covered by 
Anthem’s PPO plans. 68  Anthem’s data showed a “fivefold variation in 
prices with no measurable difference in quality,” with some hospitals 
charging anywhere from $15,000 to $110,000 for hip and knee replacement 
surgeries.69  Relying on this data, while ensuring that sufficient choices 
were available to CalPERS’ members, Anthem set a reference price of 
$30,00070 for knee and hip replacements.71 The reference price only applied 
to the hospital’s facility fee and not to physicians’ fees or fees for other 
providers, such as physical therapists.72 
 Anthem selected forty-one hospitals as “value-based purchasing 
design” (VBPD) facilities after determining that the prices those facilities 
offered for knee and hip replacements were less than or equal to $30,000, 
the quality of care was acceptable, and in the aggregate the hospitals 
provided sufficient access to CalPERS members.73 The hospitals classified 
as non-VBPD facilities charged more than $30,000 for knee and hip 
replacements. Members still had to pay the coinsurance amounts for up to a 
maximum of $3,000. 74  If a member chose a facility with a negotiated 
reference price of less than or equal to $30,000, he would only have to pay 
                                                                                                                                      
67 Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 2. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.; James C. Robinson & Timothy T. Brown, Increases in Cost Sharing 
Redirect Patient Volumes and Reduce Hospital Prices for Surgery, 32 HEALTH 
AFF. 1392, 1393 (2013). Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 2. “[E]ven when hospitals’ 
quality scores—based on readmission rates, infection rates and the rate of revision 
of the original surgery—were held constant, the price variation remained.” Id. 
70 Medicare on average paid $14,324 for inpatient knee and hip replacements 
in 2011. National and State Summaries of Inpatient Charge Data, FY2011, 
Microsoft Excel Version, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/Inpatient2011.html. 
71 Id. 
72 Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1393. 
73 Id. at 1393. “Quality measurements included whether the facility had been 
accredited by a recognized quality accrediting entity, whether it performed a 
sufficient number of joint replacement surgeries annually (because surgical volume 
is associated with positive outcomes), and its scores on the surgical prevention 
indicators reported by hospitals to the Joint Commission, as well as its 
participation in the California hospital quality reporting system and its results 
reported by that system.” Id.  
74 Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 2.  
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the capped coinsurance amount for the procedure. But if a member selected 
a facility with a procedure price of more than $30,000, then he would be 
responsible for the gap price in addition to the capped coinsurance 
amount.75  
 As a result of the RP, CalPERS saved $2.8 million in the first year 
of implementation and patient cost-sharing decreased by approximately 
$300,000.76 An extended examination of the program from 2008 to 2012 
and comparison with non-CalPERS Anthem members showed that the RP 
program incentivized patients to choose lower-priced facilities.77 Figure 1 
shows that in 2010, before the RP program began, forty-eight percent of the 
patients chose non-VBPD facilities for hip and knee replacement surgeries, 
whereas that number decreased to thirty-seven percent in 2011 after the RP 
program began.78 Also, the number of CalPERS members choosing VBPD 
facilities increased from fifty-two to sixty-three percent from 2010 to 
2011. 79  This increase was not observed for the non-CalPERS Anthem 
population. 80  Controlling for other confounding factors, the analysis 
concluded that in 2011, RP itself caused a 28.5 percent increase in the 
volume for VBPD facilities among CalPERS enrollees.81  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
75 Id. For example, a member with a ten percent coinsurance who got a hip 
replacement at a facility charging $29,000 for the procedure would pay $2,900. 
But, if the same member chose a facility that charged $32,000 for the hip 
replacement, he would have to pay $3,000 coinsurance amount (ten percent of 
32,000 would be $3,200, but that amount is capped at $3,000). Also, the member 
would be responsible for the difference between the reference price ($30,000) and 
the price the facility charged ($32,000), which is $2,000. So the member will pay a 
total of $5,000. 
76 Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 3.  
77 Id. 
78 Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1393. 
79 Id. at 1393–94. 
80 Id. at 1394.  
81 Id. at 1395. 
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Figure 1: Patients Choosing non-VBPD (high price) or VBPD (low-
price) Hospitals for Hip or Knee Replacement Surgery, 2008–201282 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The RP program also had an effect on hospital prices. Figure 2 
shows a comparison between the prices charged by VBPD and non-VBPD 
hospitals for knee and hip replacement surgeries from 2008 to 2012. After 
the implementation of the RP program in 2011, the average price charged 
by the VBPD hospitals decreased by 5.6 percent and then increased 
slightly. But, the prices charged by non-VBPD hospitals decreased by 34.3 
percent in 2011.83  Although, in 2011, half of the non-VBPD hospitals 
continued to increase their prices and half of them reduced prices, the 
average price reductions were “more than twice as large for the facilities 
that reduced the prices ($11,048 per patient) [when compared to] the 
average price increase for those that increased prices ($4,097).”84   Overall, 
hospitals decreased the prices they charged to CalPERS enrollees for hip 
and knee replacement procedures.85 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
82 Id.  
83 Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1395. 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
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Figure 2: Prices Paid for Knee and Hip Replacement Surgery in VBPD 
(low-price) and non-VBPD (high-price) California Hospitals, 2008–
201286 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the cost savings to both CalPERS and its members, 
there were positive outcomes for patients’ health. Furthermore, CalPERS 
did not observe any evidence of adverse health or quality outcomes for 
patients participating in the RP program. 87  The thirty-day general 
complication and infection rates and ninety-day follow-up admission rates 
were compared for CalPERS members who got hip and knee replacements 
in the year before and after the implementation of RP. The analysis found 
no significant difference in quality outcomes between the two years. 88 
Furthermore, CalPERS members who had their hip or knee replacement 
surgeries at a VBPD hospital had “nearly equal or better outcomes” on the 
infection and readmission measures when compared with members who 
used non-VBPD hospitals.89 After CalPERS’s success with hip and knee 
replacements, it extended the program to ambulatory surgical and imaging 
                                                                                                                                      
86 Id. at 1396. 
87 Id. at 1393.  
88 Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1393. 
89 Id. 
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procedures, including cataract surgeries, knee arthroscopies, and 
colonoscopies.90 Results from the evaluation of RP’s application to these 
additional procedures are not yet available. 
 With the application of RP to knee and hip replacements, CalPERS 
realized modest savings. Even though it did not significantly lower 
CalPERS’ overall costs, it provided a solution to reduce the costs of certain 
expensive, highly price-variable medical procedures. In addition, RP 
helped steer the health care market in the right direction when non-VBPD 
hospitals significantly reduced their prices. Granted, some VBPD hospitals 
raised their prices slightly, but CalPERS and its employees still realized 
overall savings. Overall, the RP program as implemented by CalPERS was 
a win-win-win combination resulting in cost-savings for the employer, 
price reduction by the hospitals, and benefits for the employees in terms of 
lower cost sharing and greater accountability for their health care costs. 
 Other large employers have also adopted RP as a strategy to lower 
costs of their self-insured plans. Kroger Co., one of the world’s largest 
retailers, with 375,000 employees, collaborated with WellPoint to set up its 
own RP program for radiology services and prescription medications.91 The 
radiology program includes services such as abdomen computerized 
tomography (CT), pelvic CT, chest CT, brain CT, and spine magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI).92 Using two years of health claims data, the 
company set a reference price for those services while ensuring adequate 
access for its employees. 93  It set a reference price of $800 for certain 
imaging scans in ten of the thirty-one states where it operates. 94  
                                                                                                                                      
90 Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 5; The Self-Insured School of California has 
also set up its own RP program. Id. at 5. One of the respondents of that program 
stated, “Before this program went into place, most members just knew how much 
their copays were and how much their deductible was. Some members will look at 
the EOB [explanation of benefits], and they are shocked [at the prices hospitals 
charge], but most people don’t pay attention to that information. This initiative 
brought to light the fact that there are huge differences in prices for procedures, 
and you can get most procedures done affordably without sacrificing quality.” Id.  
91 Kroger calls its RP program “target pricing program.” For consistency, I 
will refer to it as RP. Letter from Theresa Monti, Vice President, Corporate Total 
Rewards, Kroger Co., to Phyllis C. Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Employee 
Benefits Security Administration (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/faq-
xix-0017.pdf.  
92 Id. at 3. 
93 Id. at 3–4. 
94  Alex Nussbaum, Surgery Cost Caps Save Pension Fund 19% Without 
Hurting Health, BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2013, 11:00 PM), 
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Similarly, Safeway, a national grocery store chain with 150,000 
employees in separate health plans, also implemented its own RP 
program.95 Safeway, like CalPERS, also noticed significant price variations 
for colonoscopies within certain geographic markets.96 In San Francisco, 
the prices for colonoscopies varied from $848 to $5,984. 97  Safeway 
implemented a pilot program in which it set the reference price for 
colonoscopies at $1,500. This only included the facility fee; the physicians 
were paid according to a uniform fee schedule.98 After the success of its 
program, Safeway extended RP to arthroscopy, hernia repair, gall bladder 
removal, cardiac catheterization and laboratory tests, and other medical 
procedures. 99  Kroger Co., along with CalPERS and Safeway, have 
pioneered the application of RP and successfully controlled their rising 
health care costs by targeting certain medical services and procedures 
which suffer from great price variation. 
 
IV. SHORT AND LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS 
 
A. SHORT-TERM CONSIDERATIONS 
 
With the success of RP’s application to medical services and 
procedures, large employers now have an evidence base which they can 
rely on when implementing their own RP programs. Although 
implementing RP can require some initial investment, the long-term 
savings and the benefits of implementing a change in the value system of 
employees can be enormous. However, RP’s success is contingent on 
careful weighing of short- and long-term considerations.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-24/surgery-cost-caps-save-pension-
fund-19-without-hurting-health.html. 
95  James C. Robinson & Kimberly MacPherson, Payers Test Reference 
Pricing And Centers Of Excellence To Steer Patients To Low-Price And High-
Quality Providers, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2028, 2032 (2012); In 2008, before the 
colonoscopy RP program, Safeway implemented RP for pharmaceuticals. Lechner 
et al., supra note 9, at 5. 
96 Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 95, at 2032. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. The pilot was extended to other markets where the RP was set at $1,250. 
99  Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 95, at 2032–33. 451 of the 847 
laboratory tests covered by Safeway’s benefit plan have been subject to RP. Id. at 
2033. 
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1. Ensuring Network Adequacy 
 
Maintaining proper network adequacy is a critical area that should 
be considered by health plans looking to adopt RP. RP programs should not 
be a subterfuge, allowing insurers to create the “appearance of maintaining 
a broad network.”100 By reducing the amount that is fully reimbursable for 
a certain procedure, an insurer can disincentivize consumers from choosing 
the in-network providers that charge more than the reference price. In 
essence, an insurer can create smaller networks within the larger in-
network provider sphere 
Network adequacy is generally defined by states as “a health plan’s 
ability to deliver the benefits promised by providing reasonable access to a 
sufficient number of in-network primary care and specialty physicians, as 
well as other health care services included under the terms of the 
contract.”101 RP programs can blur the line between in-network and out-of-
network providers and, therefore, make it difficult to ascertain network 
size. By treating in-reference priced providers as out-of-network providers, 
RP creates mini networks within the already established network. A 
provider that negotiates with the insurer to be considered in-network can be 
treated as out-of-network for a reference-priced procedure while still being 
in-network for other procedures and services. It is important to note that so 
far, only large employers with self-insured plans have implemented RP. 
Self-insured plans are not subject to state regulations relating to health 
insurance102 and “there are no federal network adequacy standards for large 
group health plans and no state or federal network adequacy standards for 
self-insured group health plans.”103 These mini networks-within-networks 
for reference priced procedures are generally immune from network 
adequacy requirements.  
Glaudemans et al. raise concerns with the unregulated nature of 
network adequacy for self-insured plans implementing RP. 104  First, RP 
programs have the potential to confuse customers since they have to 
                                                                                                                                      
100  Letter from Robert Restuccia, available at 
https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/faq-xix-0012.pdf. 
101  Sally McCarthy & Max Farris, ACA Implications for State Network 
Adequacy Standards, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (2013), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2013/08/aca-
implications-for-state-network-adequacy-standards.html. 
102 FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 696 
(7th ed. 2013).   
103 Glaudemans et al., supra note 12.  
104 Id.  
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navigate the in-network and out-of-network lists and also the referenced-
priced provider list.105 This confusion can hamper customers’ ability to 
access medical services, and the access problem can be worsened if 
consumers receive insufficient information.106 Second, “[p]lans may seek to 
develop broad networks with seemingly generous payment rates, only to 
subsequently adopt aggressive reference pricing structures that render the 
seemingly generous contracts moot.” 107  This strategy can undermine 
consumers’ ability to choose a plan that includes their regular providers and 
create uncertainty as to which provider is in-network or out-of-network. 
Lastly, there is concern that the traditional methods of assessing network 
adequacy based on “ratios, totals, and drive times”—number of primary 
care providers in a given population or service area, appropriate mix of 
community hospitals and tertiary care facilities, and distance a patient has 
to drive to access a particular specialty—might not be adequate to assess 
the adequacy of mini RP networks. 
Having sufficient providers participate and become a part of the 
reference-priced networks is not only critical for consumer choice but also 
for RP’s mainstream adoption in to the health care system. 
 
2. Quality of Care 
 
Quality of care has to be carefully balanced when finding providers 
to participate in RP programs. The fear is that, in choosing a provider for 
the RP program, an insurer’s choice will be based on whether a provider 
offers a price at or below the reference price without considering the 
quality of care provided. Measuring quality of care108 is not an easy task,109 
                                                                                                                                      
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 “High-quality care” has been defined by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) as 
“care that is safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable (with 
no disparities between racial or ethnic group).” Christina Bielaszka-DuVernay, 
Improving Quality and Safety, 33 HEALTH AFF., 1, 2 (2011). 
109  Robert H. Brook et al., Defining and Measuring Quality of Care: A 
Perspective from US Researchers, 12 INT. J. FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 281, 
281 (2000); Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Six Challenges in Measuring the Quality of 
Health Care, 16 HEALTH AFF. 7, 7 (1997) (“patients, providers, and payers each 
define quality differently, which translates into different expectations of the health 
care system and thus differing evaluations of its quality”); Measuring and 
Improving Quality of Care: A Report From the American Heart 
Association/American College of Cardiology First Scientific Forum on Assessment 
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Although measuring quality in health care is not a new endeavor, the 
development of proper, effective measures has been slow.110  
The concern about quality has to be addressed on two levels: (1) in 
selecting procedures for which price variation is not related to variation in 
quality, and (2) in measuring quality of providers within the reference-
priced network. For example, in deciding the connection between price and 
quality for hip and knee replacement surgeries, CalPERS examined the 
difference in quality scores for hospitals charging prices ranging from 
$15,000 to $110,000 and looked at the hospitals’ readmission rates, 
infection rates, and rates of revision of the original surgery. 111  Also, 
CalPERS monitored the quality of providers within the reference-priced 
network. It looked at the reference-priced  “hospital’s quality based on 
accreditation by recognized quality accrediting entities, whether the 
hospital performed a sufficient number of joint replacement surgeries 
annually, and the hospital’s scores on surgical prevention indicators, as 
well as participation in California’s hospital quality reporting systems.”112 
This provided CalPERS with the means to measure quality variation for 
purposes of RP among the broader provider base and within the reference 
price network to ensure that the quality of care its members were receiving 
was not inadequate and would not negatively impact its members’ health. 
CALPERS’ experience can serve as a starting point in thinking about 
                                                                                                                                      
of Healthcare Quality in Cardiovascular Disease and Stroke, AM. HEART ASS’N 
1484–1485 (2000), available at 
http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/101/12/1483.full.pdf+html (Defining the 
methodological challenges in measuring health care quality). 
110 The National Committee for Quality Insurance’s Healthcare Effectiveness 
and Data Information Set Standards (HEDIS) are used by health plans to track 
quality and services. Christina Bielaszka-DuVernay, supra note 108, at 2. The 
National Quality Forum, a nonprofit organization formed at the recommendation of 
the President’s Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in 
Health Care Industry, has “certified 34 separate health care practices and 
procedures to be effective in reducing the occurrence of adverse events.” Id. The 
Joint Commission, a private nonprofit organization, accredits hospitals and other 
health care organizations. Id. For a discussion of the improvements to be made in 
the area of quality measurements in health care, see Improving Health Care 
Quality: The Path Forward, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 113th 
Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Mark B. McClellan, Dir., Engelberg Ctr. for Health 
Care Reform, Brookings Inst.). 
111 Letter from Robert Restuccia, supra note 100; James Robinson & Kimberly 
MacPherson., Payers Test Reference Pricing And Centers Of Excellence To Steer 
Patients To Low-Price And High-Quality Providers, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS (2012).  
112 Id. 
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effective and efficient ways of measuring and monitoring quality in RP 
programs. 
 
3. Adequacy of the Reference Price 
 
The reference price should be set at a level that encourages 
provider participation, does not limit access to care, and allows the issuer to 
attain cost savings.113 But setting the price inappropriately low can have the 
following adverse consequences: (1) the consumer will pay more out-of-
pocket for the procedures above the reference price; (2) with time, hospitals 
will lower their price and join the RP program; (3) participating hospitals 
will increase the prices for other services and procedures not subject to RP; 
(4) there will be “consolidation among providers, which will increase 
negotiating power among providers”; or (5) RP programs will fail due to 
insufficient provider participation and increased patient cost-sharing.114 If 
the reference price is set too high, it will provide an abundance of choices 
for the consumer but it will not lead to maximization of savings, as desired 
by the plan sponsor.115 Community Catalyst suggested that the reference 
price should be  “set high enough so that the price reflects what the 
majority of high-quality providers within that region charge for care.”116 
With these limitations and with the great variation in prices for procedures 
around the nation in mind, prices for RP programs for services and 
procedures have to be set locally or regionally.117 Some organizations have 
even warned against setting a reference price across states because 
providers will negotiate higher prices in regions where they have 
significant market power.118 Reference prices will be a critical factor in 
ensuring a meaningful choice for the consumers and RP’s success in the 
long term. 
 
4. Consumer Education 
 
Consumer education is the keystone of RP’s success because it 
ensures that participants have the necessary tools to make informed 
                                                                                                                                      
113 Paul Fronstin, supra note 7, at 10. 
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Letter from Robert Restuccia, supra note 100. Community Catalyst is a 
non-profit consumer advocacy organization.  
117 Id. 
118 FAMILIES USA, supra note 15, at 7.  
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decisions when choosing providers for procedures and services subject to 
RP. For example, before an insured consumer enters into a plan, he should 
be informed by the insurer of the procedures subject to RP, the reference 
price for each procedure, the amount in excess of the reference price that 
does not fall under the insurer’s definition of out-of-pocket costs, and what 
does and does not count towards the annual out-of-pocket maximums.119 
Furthermore, before a consumer receives a service that is subject to RP, the 
insurer should inform him as to which providers charge at or below the 
reference price,120 the reference price for that service and the insured’s 
obligation if a higher priced provider is chosen, and guidance on requesting 
an exception from the RP program.121 
 
5. Exceptions 
 
Allowing exceptions prevents consumers from being subject to RP 
if they do not have the time or ability to make a price-sensitive decision, 
and also provides flexibility to the RP program to accommodate the 
individualized nature of health and sickness. Consumers suffering from 
certain serious conditions might require referenced-priced procedures and 
services from providers who are not in the reference-priced network.  
Providers treating patients with chronic conditions need to be involved in 
the management and treatment of the chronic condition in order to ensure 
continuity of care.  Exceptions should also be allowed for patients whose 
health conditions require services of a non-reference-priced provider or 
specialist. 
Additionally, RP programs should allow for exceptions if a 
patient’s health needs or circumstances require him to see a non-reference 
priced provider for a reference-priced procedure. An exceptions process 
should include a case-by-case evaluation with fair outcomes. The specific 
                                                                                                                                      
119  Letter from Yvonne Clearwater, Acting Deputy Dir. Health Products. 
Illinois Dep’t of Ins., to U.S. Dep’ts of Labor, Health and Human Servs, and 
Treasury (July 30, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/faq-xix-0009.pdf; Letter 
from Edward Potanka, Vice President Chief Counsel, Legal and Pub. Affairs, 
Cigna, to Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/faq-xix-0027.pdf.  
120 Letter from Karin Feldman, Benefits and Social Ins. Policy Specialist, Am. 
Fed’n of Labor and Congress Indus. Org. to Office of Health Plan Standards and 
Compliance Assistance, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Aug. 1, 
2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/faq-xix-0031.pdf. 
121  Letter from R. Douglas Lemmerman, available at 
https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB52-0076.pdf. 
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situations that will give rise to the granting of an exception might be 
different under each program. For example, American Cancer Society 
(ACS) and Families USA suggested that exceptions should be available in 
situations in which requiring the consumer to choose a provider within the 
reference price would harm the consumer’s care coordination,122 cause the 
consumer to travel a great distance to go to that provider, or involve long 
wait times for the consumer.123 The individualized nature of health and 
health care requires that RP programs incorporate a process by which a 
patient’s case can be evaluated on an individual basis. 
Additionally, exceptions should be granted for a consumer 
receiving an emergency procedure and who might not have the time or 
ability to browse reference-priced providers. 124  That is why CalPERS 
excluded any emergency knee or hip replacement surgeries received by an 
employee from the restrictions of the RP program.125 Lastly, exceptions 
should be considered when a consumer’s health conditions or 
complications require more costly care services and procedures that are not 
provided by every healthcare facility or provider.126 For many consumers, 
especially with certain co-morbidities or serious health conditions, 
continuity of care trumps cost savings.  
 
B. LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Besides the concerns that the current RP programs raise, there are 
many larger concerns that need to be addressed when deciding the long-
term viability of RP. RP is a blunt mechanism for cutting health care costs 
that needs to be carefully implemented with a proper evaluation of both 
short- and long-term considerations. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
122 Letter from Lydia Mitts, Senior Policy Analyst, Families USA, to Sec’y 
Jack Lew, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Sec’y Thomas E. Perez, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
and Sec’y Sylvia Matthews Burwell, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. (July 
31, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/faq-xix-0014.pdf. 
123 Letter from R. Douglas Lemmerman, supra note 121.  
124 Hau Liu, Closing the Gap: Reducing Price Variance in Health Care with 
Reference-Based Pricing, CASTLIGHT HEALTH, 6 (July 2012), 
http://content.castlighthealth.com/rs/castlighthealth/images/RBP-White-
Paper_July-2012_draft4.pdf.  
125 Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 2. 
126 Paul Fronstin, supra note 7, at 8. 
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1. Rewarding Efficiency and Quality 
 
 Even though the main goal of RP is to reduce and control the rising 
cost of health care services, it does not adequately focus on efficiency. 
After a reference price has been set, there is a perverse incentive for 
hospitals already charging below the reference price to increase their prices 
to match the reference price. This phenomenon was seen in the CalPERS 
experiment where the VBPD hospitals that were already charging less than 
$30,000 for hip and knee replacements raised their prices after the RP 
program was put in place.127 RP will, however, motivate hospitals charging 
more than the reference price to bring down their prices. As Amanda 
Lechner et al. stated, RP “is a ‘blunt instrument’ that excludes providers 
with the highest prices but does not reward extremely efficient 
providers.”128  This phenomenon is similar to what has been observed in the 
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). Under the PPS, provider 
reimbursement is based on paying the same rate for the same services by 
categorizing health care services into diagnostic related groups (DRGs).129 
Karen Davis and Stuart Guterman explained: 
 
Such a system of payment rewards those hospitals and 
physicians that efficiently produce those units of care 
(hospital stays and physicians’ visits and procedures) 
because they can pocket any difference between the fixed 
price they are paid for each unit and the amount it costs 
them to produce it. The main disadvantage of this approach 
is that although it rewards providers for producing each 
                                                                                                                                      
127 Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1396; “The benefit design does not 
reward the provider that charges $15,000 any more than the provider that charges 
$30,000.” Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 8. 
128 Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 8.  
129 “The DRG payment rates cover most routine operating costs attributable to 
patient care, including routine nursing services, room and board, and  diagnostic 
and ancillary services. The CMS creates a rate of payment based on the “average” 
cost to deliver care (bundled services) to a patient with a particular disease. The 
DRG rates do not expressly include direct medical education costs, outpatient 
services, or services covered by Medicare Part B . . . The DRGs classify all human 
diseases according to the affected organ system, surgical procedures performed on 
patients, morbidity, and sex of the patient.” Medicare Hospital Prospective 
Payment System: How DRG Rates are Calculated and Updated, OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 5 (Aug. 2001), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00200.pdf.  
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unit of care efficiently, it also rewards providers for 
producing a greater quantity of services, even if the same 
or better patient outcomes could be achieved with fewer 
services or a less expensive combination of services. As a 
result, Medicare’s payment policy still does not encourage 
efficiency in its overall provision of care over time or over 
an episode of illness.130 
 
In the PPS, payments do not reward efficiency but instead pay for the care 
provided. Similarly, in an RP program, once the reference price is set, 
already-efficient hospitals charging below the reference price have no 
incentive to keep costs at that level, or try to become even more efficient, 
because of the reference price guarantee. Additionally, the outcome of the 
procedure or quality of care provided does not change the level of payment 
that the hospital will receive for a reference-priced procedure. The price-
saving potential of RP should be carefully weighed against efficiency and 
quality of care. 
 
2. Preventing Disruption of Continuity of Care  
 
 RP’s effect on continuity of care is especially critical for patients 
with chronic conditions. Although there are multiple definitions of 
continuity of care, it has several accepted dimensions: informational 
continuity, chronological or longitudinal continuity, geographic continuity, 
interdisciplinary continuity, interdisciplinary or team-based continuity, and 
family continuity. 131  RP brings into question informational continuity, 
chronological or longitudinal continuity, and team-based continuity.  
Informational continuity is defined as “the availability of patient 
information to providers throughout a healthcare system.”132 With slower 
than expected acceptance and use of electronic health record systems 
                                                                                                                                      
130 Karen Davis & Stuart Guterman, Rewarding Excellence and Efficiency in 
Medicare Payments, 85 THE MILIBANK Q. 449, 451 (2007). 
131 John W. Saultz, Defining and Measuring Interpersonal Continuity of Care, 
1 ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 134, 136 (2003). (Geographic continuity is defined as 
“care that is provided with continuity regardless of the location of the patient 
(office, home, hospital, etc.).” Interpersonal continuity refers to a “special type of 
longitudinal continuity in which an ongoing personal relationship between the 
patient and care provider is characterized by personal trust and responsibility”). 
132 Gina Agarwal & Valorie A Crooks, The Nature of Informational Continuity 
of Care in General Practice, 58 BRIT. J. OF GEN. PRAC. e1, e1 (2008). 
2016 REFERENCE PRICING 75 
 
 
within hospitals,133 it is difficult to imagine how the flow of information 
between reference-priced providers and a patient’s regular providers will 
allow continuity of care. Chronological or longitudinal continuity is 
defined as “a patient seeing the same provider over time and developing a 
relationship based upon trust.”134 Since laboratory and imaging services—
some of the common services subjected to RP—are generally not 
performed by a patient’s usual physician, the disruption of care might not 
be an issue if RP is applied to those services. For hip and knee replacement 
surgeries, however, the relationship of trust that a patient establishes with 
his or her provider before the surgery is essential to a patient’s decision 
when and where to get the surgery. In addition, a patient’s care can be 
disrupted when he receives the pre-surgery care and the surgery itself from 
different providers who might not be able to effectively share the patient’s 
information. This could have harmful effects on the patient’s health and 
post-surgery care. The same problem exists with the lack of team-based 
continuity. Team-based continuity is defined as “care that allows previous 
knowledge of the patient to be present even when the patient requires a 
wide range of services spanning the traditional medical specialties.”135 If a 
the patient’s usual provider is not part of the same team as the reference-
priced provider who performs the surgery that causes a disruption in team-
based continuity.  
These scales of continuity of care play an even more significant 
role for patients with chronic conditions and the elderly. For example, a 
person suffering from Ulcerative Colitis would prefer that his regular 
gastroenterologist performs the colonoscopy to check his colon and look 
for any signs of tumor formation. If this specialist does not work for a 
reference-priced hospital, then the patient will have to make an unfair 
choice between having his specialist perform the colonoscopy and paying 
the gap price or choosing a reference-priced provider and disrupting the 
care and management of his chronic condition. Continuity of care is 
essential for the management of chronic conditions and RP can hinder that 
                                                                                                                                      
133  Only twelve percent of the 2,952 hospitals surveyed “had instituted 
electronic physicians’ notes across all units,” and only seventeen percent of the 
hospitals has “computerized provider-order entry for medications was reported as 
having been implemented across all clinic units.” Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of 
Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals, 360 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1628, 1631 
(2009). 
134 Paul Beattie et al., Longitudinal Continuity of Care Is Associated With 
High Patient Satisfaction With Physical Therapy, 85 PHYSICAL THERAPY 1046, 
1047 (2005).  
135 John Saultz, supra note 131, at 136. 
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flow if RP is blindly applied to all categories of patients. 
 A study conducted by Mainous III and Gill found that continuity of 
care with a clinician decreases the likelihood of future hospitalizations.136 
Also, continuity with a provider has been found to be more important than 
continuity with a health care site.137 Patients with a continuous relationship 
with their physicians are “more satisfied with their care, are more likely to 
take medications correctly, and are more likely to have problems identified 
by their physician.” 138  Besides these benefits, continuity of care is 
significantly associated with decreased emergency department visits. 
Having continuity of care is important for patients, especially those 
suffering from chronic conditions, 139  and forcing consumers to obtain 
procedures from reference-priced providers, if different from their regular 
providers, might compromise the continuity of care their illness demands. 
Health plans looking to adopt RP should consider whether and to what 
extent continuity of care will be affected for procedures and services 
subject to RP and how to prevent patients with chronic health conditions 
from disruption of care.  
 
3. Improving Cost Savings 
 
RP can compromise continuity and efficiency of care for cost 
savings. But, if those cost savings are insignificant, they do not provide an 
incentive to insurers to use such a harsh cost-cutting tool and spend the 
time, effort, and money to institute an RP program. A recent study 
conducted by the Center for Studying Health System Change (CSHSC) 
showed that RP for “shoppable health care services” will only lead to 
                                                                                                                                      
136 Arch G. Mainous III & James M. Gill, The Importance of Continuity of 
Care in the Likelihood of Future Hospitalization: Is Site of Care Equivalent to a 
Primary Clinician?, 88 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1539, 1540 (1998); “An 
explanation for this finding is that continuity with a physician leads to increased 
knowledge and trust between a patient and a physician. This increased knowledge 
and trust may make it easier for the physician to manage medical problems in the 
office or over the telephone and thereby avoid hospitalization.” James M. Gill et 
al., The Effect of Continuity of Care on Emergency Department Use, 9 ARCHIVES 
OF FAM. MED. 333, 333 (2000).  
137 Mainous III & Gill, supra note 136, at 1540. 
138 Gill et al., supra note 136, at 333.  
139 See generally Anton R. Miller et al., Continuity of Care for Children with 
Complex Chronic Health Conditions: Parents’ Perspectives, 9 BMC HEALTH 
SERVS. RES. 1, 1 (2009).  
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modest savings.140 The study quantified the share of spending attributable 
to “shoppable health care services” and simulated the effect of RP on those 
services. 141  The study analyzed RP for both inpatient and outpatient 
services using 2011 enrollment and claims data from 528,000 active and 
retired nonelderly U.S. autoworkers and their dependents.142 The study was 
limited to nineteen metropolitan markets in the Midwest, each with at least 
4,000 enrollees.143  
While imaging and laboratory tests accounted for 13.9 percent of 
total health care spending in the claims data, the savings, after applying RP 
to the shoppable imaging and laboratory services, accounted for only 1.9 
percent of total spending.144 Savings for other shoppable services did not 
look too promising: inpatient hospital stays: 0.6 percent; outpatient hospital 
services/ambulatory procedures and physician office visits: 2.1 percent; 
uncomplicated hip and knee replacements: 0.2 percent; and all other 
shoppable services: 4.8 percent.145 Overall, regardless of the percentage of 
total spending that the procedure accounted for, the resulting savings, after 
applying RP to those procedures, were minimal.146 Generalizing from these 
findings, the authors of the study cautioned against drawing broad 
conclusions from CalPERS’ success with RP because even though there 
was “a dramatic percentage decline in prices and spending on knee and hip 
replacements,” there was only “an extremely small percentage decline in 
total spending.”147  Despite the capped contribution approach for highly 
price-variable procedures, RP might not have a significant impact on the 
health plan sponsors’ total spending. However, the study did not discourage 
                                                                                                                                      
140 Chapin White & Megan Eguchi, Reference Pricing: A Small Piece of the 
Health Care Price and Quality Puzzle, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, 6 
(2014), file:///C:/Users/Srishti/Downloads/Research_Brief_No._18%20(2).pdf. A 
“shoppable health care service” was defined as must typically be scheduled in 
advance, there must be more than one provider in a market that can perform the 
service, and there has to be price data available for the different providers,” and for 
which patients would have information about the quality of providers. Id. at 2. 
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 6.  
145 White & Eguchi, supra note 140, at 6. 
146 Id. Percentages of total spending by types of procedures were as follows: 
Inpatient procedures: 6.4 percent; outpatient hospital services/ambulatory 
procedures and physician office visits: eighteen percent; and all other shoppable 
services: 35.3 percent.  
147 Id.  
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using RP as a tool to cut health care costs; instead, it recommended 
applying RP to broader categories of procedures, realizing that RP can be 
“a useful step on the path to more reasonable pricing.”148 If RP is being 
touted as a cost-saving tool, evidence of small savings casts doubt on its 
usefulness and viability. But, greater cost savings will be realized as more 
employers and insurers adopt RP, the number of procedures subject to RP 
increases, and RP is combined with payment reform strategies.149  
 
4. Monitoring Potential Cost Shifting 
 
RP’s potential to shift costs should be closely monitored to prevent 
its negative effects on affordability of care. The fact that RP can be used as 
a way to shift costs from providers to consumers is a matter of concern.150 
But, this cost shifting can be prevented if consumers are provided sufficient 
information to understand RP and choose providers within the reference 
price.151  
However, another type of cost shifting is more nuanced and not 
addressed by RP.152 In order to understand this cost-shifting phenomenon, 
let’s look at an example. A health plan has decided to impose a reference 
price of $30,000 on hip replacements. An area hospital lowers its price for 
that procedure from $40,000 to $30,000 in order to keep its market share 
and prevent losing the health plan’s customers. That hospital can make up 
that difference of $10,000 by increasing the price of one or more 
procedures that are not capable of being reference priced, such as 
emergency cardio thoracic surgery. This cost shifting seems natural for a 
hospital to do but it also chips away at one of the goals of RP—to lower 
prices of health care services by reducing the amount paid to providers. 
                                                                                                                                      
148 Id. at 6–7. 
149 See infra Section V. 
150 Letter from Karin Feldman, supra note 120; Timothy Jost, Implementing 
Health Reform: Third-Party Payments and Reference Pricing, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(May 22, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/05/22/implementing-health-
reform-third-party-payments-and-reference-pricing/ (“if employers move to 
defined-contribution payment for employee benefits and insurers move toward 
reference pricing, we may reach a point where the combined premium and cost-
sharing expenses shifted to employees simply become intolerable”).  
151 Price transparency is discussed in the next section. 
152 From Reference Pricing to Value Pricing, CATALYST FOR PAYMENT 
REFORM, 
http://www.catalyzepaymentreform.org/images/documents/CPR_Action_Brief_Re
ference_Pricing.pdf. 
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Also, consumers do not stand to benefit in the end when on one hand, they 
save money by choosing a reference-priced provider for a reference-priced 
service, while on the other, they are the targets of balanced billing for an 
emergency, non-reference-priced procedure. 
Lastly, there is cost shifting from facility to non-facility charges. In 
the CalPERS RP experiment, the “$30,000 payment limit applied only to 
the hospital’s allowed charges, not to the fees charged by the surgeons and 
other physicians involved in the patient’s care.”153 Facility fees typically 
account for seventy-five to eighty percent of the total cost of joint 
replacements.154 With only the facility fee subject to RP, hospitals have an 
incentive to shift some of the cost to physician fees, especially since 
hospitals are buying out physician practices and increasing their non-
facility charges.155 
With multiple levels of cost shifting, health plans need to evaluate 
RP’s effects on affordability of care for consumers because if cost shifting 
is not controlled, the “balloon effect” of RP will lead to minimal overall 
savings for the health care system. 
 
5. Price Transparency: Availability and 
Comprehensibility  
 
One of the important pillars of a RP program is price 
transparency—making price information available to consumers so they 
can make informed choices. However, the gaps in price data can hinder 
both the flow of information necessary for consumers to make educated 
                                                                                                                                      
153 Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1393. 
154  Randy Cox, Reference Pricing--Just Scratching the Surface, PRICING 
HEALTHCARE BLOG (Aug. 21, 2014), http://blog.pricinghealthcare.com/reference-
pricing-taken-to-the-next-level/; Total Hip Replacement, HEALTHCARE BLUEBOOK, 
https://healthcarebluebook.com/page_ProcedureDetails.aspx?id=28&dataset=md&
g=Total+Hip+Replacement (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) (total fair price of a hip 
replacement was listed as $22,606, out of which facility fees were $18,671 
(82.59% of the total cost), physician fees were $2,764 (12.22% of the total cost), 
and anesthesiologist fees were $1,171 (5.18% of the total cost)); Total Knee 
Replacement, HEALTHCARE BLUEBOOK, 
https://healthcarebluebook.com/page_ProcedureDetails.aspx?id=31&dataset=MD
&g=Total+Knee+Replacement (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) ((total fair price of a 
knee replacement was listed as $22,720, out of which facility fees were $18,671 
(82.17% of the total cost), physician fees were $2,950 (12.98% of the total cost), 
and anesthesiologist fees were $1,098 (4.83% of the total cost)). 
155 Cox, supra note 154.  
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decisions and the success of RP programs. Without proper price and quality 
data, RP programs can push consumers into making tough health care 
decisions without appropriate information.  
Price transparency is “the availability of provider-specific 
information on the price for a specific health care service or set of services 
to consumers and other interested parties.” 156  Price information should 
ideally include a consumer’s total cost for health care services—any 
negotiated discounts; all fees for the facility, physician, lab, and other fees; 
out-of-pocket costs, including co-payments, coinsurance amounts, 
deductibles; and the gap price.157 But the problem is that “[e]ven very large 
plans will lack the historical data to accurately measure the prices they 
typically pay to smaller hospitals.”158 Some of the transparency tools used 
by health plans are limited because of the pressure from the providers with 
whom they negotiate, the operational challenges they face with respect to 
the data, and the limitations of existing consumer portals.”159 Therefore, 
price information might not be that easily accessible to a health plan itself. 
That further hinders consumers’ access to that information.  
Price transparency should accompany information about the quality 
of care provided at the reference-priced facilities. After equipping 
consumers with the information they need, it is important that the 
information readily available at the time of purchasing and is presented in 
an understandable way. Helping consumers realize that high prices do not 
necessarily mean better quality and that some of the lower-priced hospitals 
often have high quality scores160 requires displaying price and quality data 
                                                                                                                                      
156  Price Transparency, CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, 
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/PriceTransparencyActionBrief.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
157  Id. For example: “An insurer has negotiated a rate of $1,000 with a 
particular in-network provider for a chest MRI, and therefore, the cost is $1,000. A 
consumer has $200 remaining to meet his/her deductible and the coinsurance is 
$160; the individual is responsible for $360 and the insurer pays $640. In this case 
the consumer’s “price” for the MRI is $360. Price transparency exists when, for 
example, prior to seeking care, a consumer knows his price will be $360 for that 
particular provider and can compare the price for chest MRIs with other providers. 
It is also important for consumers to understand the total payment for the service, 
including what the plan (or purchaser) pays and the remaining price they owe for 
that service”). 
158 White & Eguchi, supra note 140, at 6.  
159 CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, supra note 152, at 4.  
160 Bobbi Coluni, Save $36 Billion in U.S. Healthcare Spending Through Price 
Transparency, THOMSON REUTERS, 4 (2012), 
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side-by-side. Also, providing independent information about quality will 
allow consumers to consider the cost of care of services and not rely solely 
on their physician’s advice.161 Creating an infrastructure that can obtain and 
support such information will require a significant investment, which might 
be a deterrent for employers planning to adopt RP programs.  
In addition to initial consumer education about a RP program, 
continued support should be available for consumers to understand this 
new layer of complexity. Differentiating between in-network, out-of-
network, referenced-priced-in-network providers, and non-reference-price-
in-network providers will be a difficult task, even if applied to non-urgent 
procedures. Some form of assistance should be available to consumers to 
choose from and between reference-priced providers that best suit their 
health and financial concerns. Those who adopt RP must keep these long-
term considerations in mind to ensure RP’s continued success, prevention 
of any adverse effects on consumers, and widespread adoption by health 
plans. 
 
V. VARIATIONS OF RP 
 
As the health care industry works to develop standards to evaluate 
the current RP programs, it is important to keep in mind how RP programs 
can work with the emerging health delivery and payment models. Some 
variations improve the current RP programs, while others are designed to 
lift RP from a mere cost-saving tool to an important component of the 
payment delivery system. 
Unlike CalPERS, Kroger Co.’s RP program included both the 
facility fees and professional charges.162 This prevented any cost shifting 
between the different fees and allowed consumers to see the total cost of a 
reference-priced procedure. This method, however, does not prevent 
providers from shifting costs to other post-procedure services, and it falls 
short of taking RP out of its role as a benefit-design mechanism and placing 
it alongside the payment reform tools. But it is important to note that cost-
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.hreonline.com/pdfs/06022012Extra_ThomsonReutersStudy.pdf; Anna 
D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in Health 
Care — Challenges and Potential Effects, NEW ENG. J. MED. 891, 892 (2011) 
(“The belief that higher-cost care must be better is so strongly held that higher 
price tags have been shown to improve patients’ responses to treatments through 
the placebo effect”). 
161 Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 160, at 892. 
162 Letter from Theresa Monti, supra note 91, at 3.  
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shifting between different fees can be reduced if most of the costs and fees 
associated with a procedure can be included in the reference price. 
Similarly, RP can be applied to a single or multiple CPT163 codes, thereby 
allowing the health plan to inform consumers of their finite costs. However, 
with complex procedures involving multiple CPT codes, a patient can be 
left with a large bill even if he or she chooses a reference-priced provider. 
Francois de Brantes et al. points out: 
 
For example, a physician might decide to perform multiple 
diagnostic imaging tests prior to and after the procedure, or 
to select different types of imaging tests than some of their 
peers. Similarly, after the procedure, the orthopedist might 
recommend a stay at a rehabilitation facility, while another 
might recommend a few sessions of physical therapy. 
Finally, the price might vary depending on the setting in 
which the plan member receives the service. As such, the 
price, mix, and frequency of services in a joint replacement 
procedure can vary, even when adjusting for the severity of 
the patient. 164 
 
This problem can be solved if RP is coupled with payment reform 
mechanisms, such as bundled payments. A bundled payment “is a single 
payment to providers or health care facilities (or jointly to both) for all 
services to treat a given condition or provide a given treatment.”165 It shifts 
the risk to the providers for the cost of services for a particular treatment or 
condition and any resulting preventable complications. 166  Providers are 
protected in case of serious complications in which they have to incur 
unexpected costs. Since it is a single payment to the provider, it lends itself 
                                                                                                                                      
163 CPT stands for current procedural terminology. “The CPT-4 codes are used 
to describe medical procedures and physicians services, and is maintained and 
distributed by the American Medical Association.” Code Sets, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 26, 2014, 4:01 PM.), 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/HIPAA-Administrative-
Simplification/TransactionCodeSetsStands/CodeSets.html.  
164 Francois de Brantes et al., supra note 4, at 3. 
165 Suzanne Delbanco, The Payment Reform Landscape: Bundled Payment, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/02/the-
payment-reform-landscape-bundled-payment/.  
166  Id.; see also Analysis of Bundled Payment, RAND CORP., 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR562z20/analysis-of-bundled-
payment.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).  
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to be a natural partner of RP. According to Catalyst for Payment Reform, 
“[c]oupling a reference pricing strategy with a bundled payment to 
providers for the entire episode of care could make pricing easier and 
create alignment among consumers, employers, and providers in a number 
of ways.”167 As with the current RP program, a consumer will select a 
provider that offers a reference-priced bundle and the consumer will only 
incur out-of-pocket costs if he chooses a provider with a higher priced 
bundle.168  
This combination of RP and bundled payments can result in 
“alignment” between the provider, the insurer, and the insured.169 It will 
also allow for cost predictability for both the insurer and the consumer.170 
Another benefit will be greater provider accountability for defined 
outcomes and financial liability for the provider for costs above the 
bundled reference price.171 Additionally, by including a stop loss cap at the 
95th percentile of costs, the employee and the provider can be protected 
from catastrophic out-of-pocket expenses resulting from factors outside of 
their control.172 Due to the administrative complexities,173 legal hurdles,174 
and required technological capabilities,175 bundled payments have not been 
widely accepted, despite their cost-saving potential.  
In addition to bundled payments, Catalyst for Payment Reform 
predicts that RP will be incorporated with other payment reform methods, 
including centers for excellence contracting176 and global payments.177 RP 
                                                                                                                                      
167 Francois de Brantes et al., supra note 4, at 1.  
168 Id. at 4.  
169 Id. at 6. 
170 Id.  
171 Id.  at 7. 
172 Francois de Brantes et al., supra note 4, at 7.  
173 Brook et al., RAND CORP., supra note 20. 
174  Legal Issues in Designing Bundled Payments and Shared Savings 
Arrangements in the Commercial Payor Context, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013/rwjf407662 (“the 
legal framework for compliance has not become more flexible for bundled 
payments in the commercial payor context”). 
175 Information Technology for Bundled Payment, THE MITRE CORP. (Dec. 
16, 2011), 
http://www.ahcancal.org/facility_operations/hit/Documents/IT_Bundled_Payment.
pdf. 
176 Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 111, at 2029. (“Centers-of-excellence 
contracting channels patients to hospitals that provide high-quality care and are 
willing to discount their prices in exchange for the higher volume of patients”). 
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has the potential to become a valuable cost-saving tool, but its limitations 
need to be recognized and monitored closely. The Department should start 
by taking a closer look at the current RP programs to assess whether RP is 
a strategy that is compatible with the goals of the evolving health care 
system.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
RP is an effective benefit-design model that is helping to bend the 
health care cost curve. Andrea Caballero, Program Director at the Catalyst 
for Payment Reform, perfectly stated that even though RP is a “short-term 
fix,” it is “one of the few short-term fixes that is actually seeing positive 
results.”178 With its success in both the international pharmaceutical market 
and the U.S. market for medical procedures and services, it has proven its 
potential as a cost-saving device. But, it has its limitations, in terms of 
scope and application, that must be recognized so that regulators 
overseeing its implementation can effectively track its progress, monitor its 
effect on access, cost, and quality of care, and allow its incorporation into 
new payment reform mechanisms. While the health care system should be 
wary of new strategies which can potentially impact consumers’ access to 
affordable, high-quality care, bending the cost curve will require disruptive 
innovations that can transform the power dynamics in the health care 
marketplace. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
177 “Global payment models vary based on the amount of risk assumed by the 
provider organization and the methods used to limit risks. Risks can be limited 
based on what services are included in the global payment and what, if any, 
adjustments are considered when evaluating provider performance.” Ann 
Robinow, The Potential of Global Payment: Insights from the Field, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2
010/Feb/1373_Robinow_potential_global_payment.pdf.  
178 Monday, November 18, 2013: Reference Pricing: Will Price Caps Help 
Contain Healthcare Costs?, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJTmlo_A678 (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
